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The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind by Cora. Diamond

By Cora. Diamond

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Who will not treat those propositions as expressing any thoughts at all, neither thoughts in a supposed technical Tractatus sense nor non-thoughts in that sense but nevertheless indications of something that is unsayably so. "What cannot be said" is not something that is unsayably so. The Tractatus, that is, is not an attack on metaphysics as merely unsayable. What cannot be thought cannot be thought, and not cheating on that means not treating "cannot be thought" as meaning unsayably so. 28 The Kantian demand that logic be absolutely distinguishable from what empirical psychology can tell us of the natural laws of human thinking is important for both Frege and Wittgensteinimportant for the ways in which they show that philosophical confusion can arise from treating the non-arbitrariness of logic as if it were a matter of agreement with something external to the understanding.

That is, the not looking at the details of our methods of judging what is real goes with the idea of something that we are really after, whatever the details may be of how we try to get it. The details appear irrelevant, because we think we can make out something else, which, 46 of 345 10/21/2010 05:58 PM file:///home/gyuri/downloads/Diamond/1659__9780... if we did not have it or at least believe that we did, would make pointless our actual practices of using evidence as we do in judging what is real.

The idea of logical categories as giving a genuine classification of our objects of thought treats the grasp of categories as if, in it, the understanding were in relation to something external to itself. We can fail to be clear about these categories, a failure which may be reflected in or dependent on a language which does not show them systematically, as Frege's concept-script does; but adequacy and inadequacy of language are a matter of language's revealing what is internal to it as language, what belongs to it as capable of expressing thoughts, what belongs to thought as thought.

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